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1. INTRODUCTION  
Researchers point to the cost of trading as an economically significant phenomenon that 
materially impacts portfolio decision-making and fund manager performance.
1
 The 
quantification of trading costs and analyses of their determinants has been the subject of 
ongoing research. Most empirical evidence on institutional trading costs has stemmed from 
studies assessing trading on major U.S. markets (Chan and Lakonishok (1993, 1995) and 
Keim and Madhavan (1995, 1997)). These studies have typically measured trading costs by 
measuring the price impact of block trades.
2
  These studies show that price impact costs are 
significant and are influenced by trade size, firm capitalisation, and investment style. These 
studies have also consistently documented an asymmetry in both the magnitude and direction 
of trading costs incurred on purchases and sales. In general, (i) purchases are found to have 
higher price impact than sales and (ii) there is a price continuation after a purchase, consistent 
with an information effect, while there is a price reversal following a sale, consistent with a 
liquidity effect. 
 
This paper extends the literature on institutional trading costs in three ways. First, it provides 
out-of-sample evidence in a non-U.S. market in a rapidly growing asset class, namely small-
cap equities. Second, it offers a potential explanation for the observed asymmetry in post-
trade effects in results documented in previous research. Third, we examine the effect of 
liquidity shocks on the trading costs of active small-cap fund managers.  
 
                                                 
1
 Examples include Keim (1999) and Wermers (2000). 
2
 Bessembinder (2003) suggests that the ideal measure of trading costs is the “implementation shortfall” as 
defined by Perold (1988).  This measure compares the value-weighted average price of a trade (including fees 
and commissions) to the price at the time an order decision was made.  This measure requires proprietary data 
which is not generally available to researchers.  Therefore, the institutional trading costs are often measured 
using price impact costs.  We adopt this approach.  More generally, the microstructure literature measures 
trading costs using effective and realised spreads.  These measures are useful as proxies for costs incurred by 
small traders, rather than institutional trading costs, and therefore are not considered in this study. 
 4 
The paper examines trading costs in an Australian context. Since the cost of trading differs 
across markets, out-of-sample (non-U.S.) evidence represents an important contribution to 
the literature. Chiyachantana et al. (2004) and Domowitz et al. (2001) analyse costs across 
countries and find that trading costs vary across regions. Keim and Madhavan (1997) find 
that costs differ substantially across dealer versus order driven markets. The Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) is an electronic order driven market with no official market makers. 
Accordingly, it provides an interesting contrast to the dealer driven markets of the U.S. and a 
useful insight into order driven markets, which are now the most common market structure 
for equity markets around the world. 
 
The paper considers the issue of trading costs in the context of small-cap equities. These 
stocks are less liquid than larger stocks, have lower analyst following, and are more sensitive 
to trading activity by institutional investors. Understanding transaction costs and transaction 
cost management in these stocks is particularly important. Analysis of small-cap funds is also 
of theoretical interest, since the cost of trading is as an important explanation of the observed 
small-firm effect (Aitken and Ferris, 1991). This sector is also of significance in Australia 
due to the recent exceptional performance of these funds. Chen et al. (2010) report that small-
cap fund managers in Australia generate cumulative abnormal returns of approximately 0.60 
percent per month for the period January 1998 to March 2004. 
 
Over the sample period, small-cap funds in Australia have attracted significant inflows of 
new funds. Hence, these funds are less capital constrained than funds that have been typically 
examined in the trading cost literature. These funds are generally able to fund redemptions 
through new inflows rather than through stock sales. As a result, the sale of stock by these 
funds is less likely to be motivated by liquidity concerns. The literature argues that the 
 5 
asymmetry in the magnitude and direction of price impacts of purchases and sales is driven 
by the fact that purchases are information motivated whereas sales are liquidity motivated. 
We do not expect to observe a directional asymmetry in temporary price impacts (i.e., post-
trade) for the small-cap funds because their selling activities are more likely to be based on 
information than a current lack of liquidity.   
 
Employing a unique dataset, this paper evaluates the transaction costs incurred by 12 actively 
managed Australian small-cap equity funds offered to institutional investors, which are 
operated by nine unique institutions.
3
 This sample represents more than 55 percent of the 
Australian wholesale small-cap funds market based on value of funds under management. 
Consistent with expectations, the magnitude of trading costs incurred by these funds is 
significantly higher than the costs observed in previous research. The round-trip cost of a 
trade in a small-cap stock is shown to be 1.33 percent compared to only 0.27 percent reported 
by Aitken and Frino (1996) and 0.50 percent reported by Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) in 
earlier studies of trading costs for large stocks on ASX.
4
 There is significant asymmetry in 
the magnitude of the total price impacts observed for purchases and sales (0.99 percent for 
purchases verses -0.34 percent for sales). Both purchases and sales exhibit continuations in 
prices consistent with both having information content. Consistent with prior research, we 
find that trading costs are positively related to price and trade duration. Manager identity and 
the number of brokers involved in the execution also affect trading costs. The results also 
show that funds experiencing a positive flow exhibit higher post-trade information effects for 
sales than is the case for funds that sell on a negative flow. Thus if a fund sells a stock when 
                                                 
3
 These are the same funds (and data) used in the Chen et al. (2010) study. 
4
 It is important to note differences in the samples used in this study compared to the previous Australian 
studies.  This study examines trades from 12 small-cap funds, while Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) examined 
trades executed by a single large-cap fund manager.  Aitken and Frino (1996) did not have access to data on 
fund managers’ trades so developed a proxy using ASX SEATS data.  The proxy used was the volume of trades 
executed by the same broker in a particular stock on a single day, provided that the total trading volume was 
greater than the stock's average daily trade volume.   
 6 
there is no liquidity-driven reason to do so, markets infer that the sale is information 
motivated, and react accordingly. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 highlights the institutional 
details of the small-cap equity industry in Australia. Section 3 describes the dataset of small-
cap equity transactions. Section 4 outlines the trade packaging methodology and the package 
statistics. Section 5 outlines the fund flow analysis and univariate statistics. Section 6 defines 
the price impact measures used and estimates the impact of the costs incurred by small-cap 
equity managers in the sample. Section 7 explores the determinants of price impacts and 
section 8 concludes. 
 
2. INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
2.1 The Australian Equities Market 
The ASX is the 12
th
 largest market in the world with a total market capitalisation of 
approximately AUD 975 billion (as at June 2004).
5
 In June 2004 there were 1,459 companies 
listed on ASX. Standard and Poor’s (S&P) construct a range of benchmarks for the 
Australian equity market. The S&P/ASX 100 Index comprises the largest 100 stocks that 
trade on the ASX. It accounts for approximately 75 percent of ASX market capitalisation. 
The Small Ordinaries (Small Ords) Index comprises stocks that are included in the S&P/ASX 
300 Index but not in the S&P/ASX 100. This is the widely accepted definition of Australian 
small-cap stocks. The Small Ords Index represents approximately 7 percent of market 
capitalisation. The remaining stocks may be classified as Micro-caps. There is no index 
which covers the Micro-cap sector on ASX. Therefore, a Micro-cap proxy is developed. This 
                                                 
5
 The Australian pension fund market is fifth largest in the world (behind the United States, Japan, the United 
Kingdom and Canada). For 2009 statistics see http://www.austrade.gov.au/ArticleDocuments/2792/Data-Alert-
100205-Pension-Funds.pdf.aspx. 
 7 
Micro-cap proxy consists of those All Ordinaries Index stocks (the largest and most liquid 
500 companies) that are not S&P/ASX 300 stocks. 
 
Table 1 reports average trading activity for the S&P/ASX 100 Index, the Small Ords Index 
and Micro-cap stocks over the period January 2000 to July 2004. The results show that 
trading activity in Small Ords stocks is many times lower than trading activity in S&P/ASX 
100 stocks, but considerably higher than trading activity in Micro-cap stocks. For example, 
on average, S&P/ASX 100 stocks trade 312 times per day, compared to only 42 and nine 
times per day for Small Ords and Micro-cap stocks, respectively. Similarly, on average, 
S&P/ASX 100 stocks turnover is AUD 16.2 million per day, compared to AUD 0.55 million 
and AUD 0.095 million per day for Small Ords and Micro-cap stocks, respectively. Although 
Small Ords stocks are less liquid than S&P/ASX 100 stocks, they are sufficiently liquid to 
allow institutional investors to invest in this segment of the market. These results demonstrate 
that although Small Ords stocks represent only a small proportion of the total market (by 
capitalisation), they provide reasonably liquid investment alternative to S&P/ASX 100 
stocks. 
<Insert Table 1 here> 
2.2  The small-cap fund universe 
 
All small-cap equity funds in Australia are actively managed. Small-cap fund prospectuses 
indicate that their investment universe is defined as all stocks within the Small Ords Index. 
According to InvestorWeb a total of 32 funds comprise the small-cap wholesale funds 
management industry, and these are managed by 24 unique institutions. Based on ASSIRT
6
 
figures, the total value of funds under management in small-cap equities is AUD 4,203 
                                                 
6
 ASSIRT is an Australian data provider that provides managed fund and ratings data for funds in Australia.  
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million as at June 2004,
7
 where small-cap funds under management have grown more than 
five times since January 2000.
8
 
 
Management fees vary between small-cap equity funds, ranging from 0.53 percent to 1.65 
percent per annum. Indeed, the average management expense ratio for small-cap funds, 
documented by Chen et al. (2010), was 8.4 basis points per month (i.e. 1.01% per year). Most 
institutional small-cap equity funds close to new money when they obtain AUD 500 million 
in funds under management, or approximately 1 percent of the value of the small-cap market 
(Fechner, 2004).  
 
3. DATA 
Data on the aggregate daily trades of 12 actively managed small-cap funds (operated by nine 
different managers) are obtained from the Portfolio Analytics Database. The total value of 
assets under management by the 12 funds is AUD 2,373 million at June 2004. Therefore, 
these funds account for over 55 percent of the small-cap equity fund’s universe. Chen et al. 
(2010), who examine the same 12 funds, demonstrate that the returns-based performance of 
the funds in this sub-sample is consistent with the performance of the universe of small-cap 
funds. This demonstrates that this sample of managers is representative of the whole small-
cap market. 
 
The data comprising the Portfolio Analytics Database are collected directly from each fund 
manager. Data are provided on the basis that the identity and trading records of each 
institution remains confidential. We examine the period January 2000 to March 2004. During 
                                                 
7
 When retail small-cap funds are included, ASSIRT figures demonstrate that the total small-cap fund industry 
value, based on funds under management, is around AUD 6 billion.  
8
 See Chen et al. (2010) for further details of the growth of small-cap funds in Australia. 
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our sample period we have 46,830 observations, representing aggregated daily transactions 
for each fund manager. Of these, 26,577 are purchases and 20,253 are sales. Each observation 
contains several fields indicating the dates on which trades took place, the identity of the 
stock traded, the volume of the stock traded, the direction of trade, the volume-weighted 
average price (VWAP) of all trades by the specified manager in the specified stock on a 
particular day, and the identity of the broker executing the trade.  
 
ASX SEATS stock price data are obtained from the Securities Industry Research Centre of 
the Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). These data contain detailed information about each stock in the 
Australian market, including daily opening and closing prices, the daily high and low prices, 
best bid and ask prices at the open and close and daily trading volumes and values. Relevant 
market data are extracted from this database and matched to the Portfolio Analytics Database 
for each stock traded by a fund manager. 
 
4. TRADE PACKAGE METHODOLOGY AND STATISTICS 
Institutional investors often break up their orders into multiple trades, spanning several (and 
not necessarily adjacent) days. This strategy is adopted in order to disguise their trade 
execution and avoid excessive market impact costs. Chan and Lakonishok (1995) develop a 
trade ‘packaging’ methodology, whereby individual trades in a stock are aggregated to the 
order level by combining trades that occur in a specific stock on adjacent days. They propose 
a five-day ‘gap’ definition. This means that all trades in one particular stock on consecutive 
days are taken to be part of the same package until no trades are executed in the stock for five 
consecutive days or more. This definition is applied to the dataset and results in 13,913 ‘trade 
 10 
package’ observations.
9,10
 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the trade packages. Fifty five percent of packages 
across all stocks are purchases and forty five percent are sales. For both purchases and sales, 
the frequency of packages traded in Small Ords stocks is approximately 71 percent. Packages 
trading S&P/ASX100 stocks account for approximately seven percent of the purchase 
transactions and ten percent of the sales. The remaining approximately 20 percent of 
packages are in Micro-cap stocks or in stocks which are recently listed and therefore not 
included in any of the S&P indices.  
 
All subsequent analysis in the paper focuses on trading in Small Ords stocks. Trading in other 
stocks may enhance portfolio returns and reduce transaction costs; however, we are interested 
in measuring the transaction costs of the stocks where the managers have a mandate to trade. 
Stocks are sorted into size quartiles, each year, based on average market capitalisation. A 
breakdown of the size classification by market capitalisation appears in Panel B of Table 2. 
The average size of stocks in the smallest quartile is AUD 92 million (AUD 87 million) for 
purchases (sales), and the average size of stocks in the largest quartile is AUD 714 million 
(AUD 738 million) for purchases (sales). 
 
<Insert Table 2 here> 
 
                                                 
9
 Not all of the fund manager’s individual trades are packaged. About 15 percent of the trades are omitted due to 
managers reporting transactions prices that are either not within the high/low prices reported for the stock in a 
given day, or because there was no transaction in the stock on the day that the manager reported to have traded 
the stock. 
10
 The sensitivity of the method to the length of the ‘gap’ used (e.g. five days, six days) is also analyzed in order 
to ensure the results are not contingent on the time period chosen. The package length does not influence the 
results and therefore only the five day ‘gap’ package results are reported. 
 11 
Inconsistent with prior research, there is only a weak association between package value and 
stock size. For example in Panel C of Table 2, the mean purchase package value for the 
smallest market capitalisation quartile is AUD 315,000, whilst the mean package value for 
the highest market capitalisation quartile is AUD 353,000. Similarly, for sales, the mean 
package value for the smallest market capitalisation quartile is AUD 309,000, whilst the 
mean package value for the highest market capitalisation quartile is AUD 377,000. There is 
somewhat greater variation in the median package value across the size quartiles, where 
purchase (sale) values are AUD 129,000 (AUD 115,000) for the first quartile and AUD 
167,000 (AUD 182,000) for the fourth. 
 
Panel D of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics by trade complexity.  Trade complexity is 
proxied by the logarithmic ratio of the package trade volume to the average trading volume 
over the 40 days prior to the beginning of the package. There is an inverse relation between 
stock size and trade complexity. For packages in the smallest capitalisation stocks, this ratio 
is 2.44 for purchases and 3.32 for sales. This shows that fund managers are seeking to 
execute over twice the average daily trading volume of the stock for the smallest quartile. In 
contrast, packages in the highest capitalisation stocks typically execute 0.38 times 
(purchases) and 0.35 times (sales) the normal daily trading volume. The relative size of these 
packages can be compared to those reported in Chan and Lakonishok (1995), where the 
average values for the trade complexity proxy were approximately 0.66 and 0.61 for 
purchases and sales, respectively. For our sample, both buy and sell trades are 0.78 times 
average trading volume for all packages. 
 
Panel E of Table 2 reports the average number of trading days taken to execute a trade 
package (i.e., duration) for Small Ords stocks. On average purchase (sale) packages are 
 12 
executed over 3.5 (3.7) days. The median package executes in one day. There is an inverse 
relation between stock size and duration. Packages in the smallest quartile of stocks take 
approximately 3.7 (5.4) days to execute for purchases (sales) compared to 3.1 (3.4) days for 
purchases (sales) in the largest quartile of stocks. This compares to Chan and Lakonishok 
(1995) where 59 (63) percent of purchases (sales) are executed in less than one day. 
 
5. FUND FLOW MEASURE 
Fund inflows and outflows have been found to affect the risk-adjusted returns of purchases 
and sales and this is attributed to the liquidity demands of funds. For example, Alexander et 
al. (2007) find funds experiencing heavy inflows tend to purchase poor performing stocks as 
they attempt to work off excess liquidity. As such, we investigate whether the price impact of 
trade purchases and sales are also similarly affected by such liquidity demands. For example, 
during days of heavy inflows, we expect fund purchases to face higher price impact due to 
the urgency in placing excess liquidity. In contrast, fund sales will experience lower price 
impact as funds have no urgency in selling during times of heavy inflow.  
 
To capture the effect of fund flows, trade packages are classified into fund flow groups using 
a proxy method for flow activity. We develop a daily fund flow measure based on each 
fund’s daily transactions, where for a given day, we net out all purchases and sales made by 
each fund. For each fund, we rank the days based on the percentage of net purchases or sales. 
And scale this by the previous month’s fund net asset value. ‘Inflow’ days are those that are 
ranked in the top quartile of net buying days, and ‘outflow’ days are those that are ranked in 
the top quartile of net selling days.
11
  All remaining days are classified as ‘no flow’ days.  
                                                 
11
 The average fund daily flow percentage threshold, to be classified as positive or negative flows, is 1.14 and -
0.93 percent respectively.  
 13 
  
Each trade package is classified as an inflow, outflow, or no flow package based on the fund 
flows on the day the first trade in the package begins. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for 
the packages partitioned into flow groups. Panel A of Table 3 shows that there is little 
difference between the average size of stocks traded by flow groups. Similarly, Panel B of 
Table 3 reports that the average dollar value of the packages is generally similar for positive 
flow days and negative flow days. The average purchase (sale) package for positive flow 
days is AUD 335,000 (AUD 333,000) compared to AUD 322,000 (AUD 336,000) for 
negative flow days. Positive flow day purchases tend to be larger than negative flow day 
purchases when the package is scaled by normal trading volume. The average package size 
relative to normal daily volumes for positive flow days is 0.82 (0.91) for purchases (sales) 
compared to 0.55 (0.77) for negative flow days (Panel C of Table 3). Negative flow day 
purchases tend to be traded more patiently, with an average duration of 2.9 days compared to 
2.1 for positive flow days. For sales, the average duration for negative flow days (2.4) is 
similar to those for positive flow days (2.6).  
<Insert Table 3 here> 
 
6. PRICE IMPACT MEASURES 
The transaction cost literature has largely focussed on the price impact of block trades.  Price 
impact measures seek to capture the deviation in transaction prices caused by the block trade 
(i.e. what would the price have been, in the absence of the trade?).  Given that it is not 
possible to observe what the price would have been in the absence of the trade, there is no 
single unambiguous measure of price impact.  As a result a range of benchmark prices are 
typically considered when estimating price impact. 
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We measure price impacts using the approach set out by Holthausen et al. (1987) which are 
calculated using the following:  
lntemporary
price
PI
close
 
  
 
        (1) 



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
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PIpermanent ln          (2) 
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





open
price
PItotal ln          (3) 
 
where PItemporary, PIpermanent and PItotal represent temporary, permanent and total measures of 
price impact, price is the volume weighted price of trades executed within the trade package, 
open is the opening price on the first day of the package and close is the closing price on the 
last day of the package.12  The total price impact represents the cost of getting set (i.e., the 
market impact costs). It is expected to be positive for purchase transactions (i.e., the trade 
price is above the opening price) and negative for sell trades (i.e., the selling price is below 
the opening price). If buy trades have information content then the closing price will be above 
the trade price, and the temporary effect is of negative sign. If buyers pay a liquidity 
premium, the closing price will be below the trade price, and hence the temporary effect will 
be of positive sign. For sell trades an information effect (i.e., prices continue to fall following 
the trade) will have a positive sign, while a liquidity effect will have a negative sign. By 
construction, the permanent effect is the sum of the total effect and the temporary effect 
multiplied by -1. For our univariate analysis in Tables 4 and 5, we follow Chiyachantana et 
al. (2004) and adjust the price impact measures for market conditions using the Small 
Ordinaries Accumulation Index as the market return.  
 
                                                 
12
 The opening and closing prices are also proxied using the mid-point of the best bid and ask price at the open 
and the close. The results are qualitatively consistent using these measures and therefore are not presented.   
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Table 4 reports summary statistics for the three price impact measures used. Principal 
weighted measures of price impacts are reported as they provide a better indication of the 
economic cost of these trades to fund managers. For all trade packages (reported in the first 
row) total price impact for purchases (sales) is 0.99 percent (-0.34 percent), representing a 
round trip of 1.33 percent. Like previous research there is significant asymmetry between the 
magnitude of the price impact of purchases and sales. These costs are considerably higher 
than those reported for the Australian market in previous large-cap research. Aitken and Frino 
(1996) reported total price impact costs of 0.27 (0.00) for purchases (sales) while Comerton-
Forde et al. (2005) reported costs of 0.34 percent for purchases and 0.16 percent sales
13
. 
Round trip costs are therefore 0.27 percent in Aitken and Frino (1996) and 0.50 percent in 
Comerton-Forde et al. (2005). We observe higher costs, as expected, because our sample 
relates to smaller stocks than those previously studied in the Australian literature. 
<Insert Table 4 here> 
Inconsistent with prior research, there is symmetry in the direction of the post-trade 
information effects. Both purchases and sales exhibit price continuations following the 
package. The temporary price impact for purchases is -0.21 percent compared to 0.06 percent 
for sales. Previous research by Alexander et al. (2007) has documented an asymmetry in the 
direction of price impacts for purchases and sales and has attributed this result to the fact that 
purchases are motivated by information, whereas sales may be motivated either by 
information or by liquidity needs. The symmetry in our results (i.e., both purchases and sales 
have an information effect) may also be explained by the fact that there have been substantial 
inflows of new capital into small-cap funds over the period examined. As a result, the funds 
are less capital constrained and are more able to fund redemptions from cash inflows; hence 
liquidity motivated sales are less likely to be required. Further, the large inflow of capital 
                                                 
13
 In Comerton-Forde et al. (2005) impact costs for sales are multiplied by -1. Thus the value of 0.16 percent 
means that the trade price for a sale is below the opening price, consistent with a positive market impact cost. 
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means that funds will invest on weaker information signals. Accordingly, the information 
component of purchases is expected to be lower than for funds which have smaller capital 
inflows. 
 
To examine these issues further, the sample is partitioned into flow groups based on whether 
the trade package begins on a positive or negative flow day (as defined in Section 4). Sell 
trade packages starting on positive flow days face less capital constraints and hence are less 
likely to be liquidity motivated. In contrast, sell trade packages which begin on negative flow 
days will be more likely to be liquidity motivated. Our results, reported in Table 4, reinforce 
the capital constraint hypothesis for sales, with negative flow days having lower and 
statistically different total and temporary price impacts to positive flow days.
14
 In fact, 
positive flow day sales have total negative price impact of 0.90 percent and -0.58 percent for 
temporary price impact (with a permanent price impact of 1.49 percent, i.e., the stock rises 
during the package despite it being a sell trade). In contrast sell packages that start on 
negative flow days incur a market impact cost of -0.21 percent and a subsequent liquidity 
effect of -0.04 percent. We do not find evidence supporting a capital constraint hypothesis for 
purchases, with negative and positive flow purchases experiencing statistically similar price 
impacts for total, temporary and permanent components. 
7. DETERMINANTS OF PRICE IMPACT 
 
The determinants of price impact are assessed by adopting and extending the regression 
framework that has frequently been used in the transaction cost literature since Chan and 
Lakonishok (1993). The following regression model is estimated: 
iPosFlowNegFlowFundsizeDuration
VolTrCompMcapMarketPI




8765
4321
ln
lnlnln
                          (4) 
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 Results for positive and negative flow groups are comparable as they have similar duration as shown  in Table 
3.  
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Where PI refers to the  either total price impact or permanent price impact (unadjusted for 
market returns), lnMarket is the Small Ordinaries Index log return from the opening level on 
the first day of the trade package to the closing level on the last day of the trade package. 
lnMcap is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of the stock. lnTrComp is the natural 
logarithm of the ratio between the volume trading in the package over the average normal 
trading volume in the package 40 days before the package begins. Vol is the standard 
deviation of the natural logarithm of daily stock returns in the past 180 days. lnDuration is 
the natural logarithm of the number of days it takes to complete a package. NegFlow is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the trade package starts on a negative flow day, and 0 
otherwise. PosFlow is an analogous measure using positive flow days. 
 
Table 5 reports price impacts based on a number of package characteristics including size and 
trade complexity. These results show that there is a clear (though not monotonic) relation 
between price impact and market capitalisation. Smaller stocks exhibit larger price impacts. 
The total price impact of a purchase for a stock in the smallest quartile is 1.37 compared to 
0.72 for a stock in the largest quartile. This trend is greater for sales, where the total price 
impact for a stock in the smallest quartile is -1.32 percent compared to negative price impact 
for a stock in the largest quartile of 0.33 percent. Trade complexity also influences price 
impact. The least complex trades display lower price impact than the most complex trades. 
For example, the total price impact for the most complex quartile of purchases (sales) is 1.48 
(-0.61) percent compared to only 0.13 (0.00) percent for the least complex purchases.  
<Insert Table 5 here>  
 
Trades that take more than one day to execute incur substantially higher costs than single day 
trades. For example the total cost is -0.08 (-0.12) percent for purchases (sales) that are 
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executed over one day, while they are 1.45 (-0.46) percent for packages executed over 
multiple days. These results are consistent with Chiyachantana et al. (2004) who find that the 
execution of trades over several days increases price impact.  
 
A more formal analysis of the above issues is conducted using equation 4. The results of this 
model are reported in Table 6. The regression model is estimated separately for both 
purchases and sales for the total price impact measure (Panel A) and the permanent price 
impact (Panel B) with controls for fund fixed effects and style fixed effects (i.e. GARP 
(growth at a reasonable price), Growth, Style Neutral and Value). We also report the F-
statistic ‘Pos flow=Neg flow’ for the null hypothesis that the positive flow coefficient equals 
the negative flow coefficient.  
<Insert Table 6 here> 
Table 6 reports our results. Overall the range of adjusted R
2
 from 9.99 to 18.50 percent 
reported is consistent with previous studies examining the determinants of price impact.
15
 
Examining Table 6 Panel A, we find the market return is positively related to the price impact 
of purchases and sales consistent with the regression results in Chiyachantana et al. (2004). 
Also consistent is that package duration is statistically significant with higher price impacts 
for both purchases and sales. Inconsistent to prior research however is that the association 
between complexity of the trade and price impact; we find insignificant coefficients. 
Volatility is significantly positively for sales (though not for purchases), suggesting the price 
impact of sales increases with higher volatility stocks. Fund size is also statistically 
significant and negative for purchases suggesting the larger the fund, the lower the price 
impact of trades.  
 
                                                 
15
 Chiyachantana et al. (2004) typically find full model adjusted R
2
 of approximately 1% to 4%. Chan and 
Lakonishok (1995) report adjusted R
2
 of approximately 2% to 7%. 
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The multivariate results are also consistent with our univariate flow results from Table 4. 
‘Pos flow=Neg flow’ is statistically significant at the one percent level for sales using 
regressions that control for both fund and style fixed effects, suggesting that negative flow 
day sales have higher price impact than positive flow day sales. This difference amounts to 
49 basis points (0.61-0.12) using fund fixed effects or 0.69 basis points (0.60+0.09) using 
style fixed effects. We do not find a statistical difference in price impact between positive and 
negative flow days for purchases when we control for fund fixed effects, though when we 
control for style, purchases on negative flow days have greater price impact than purchases 
on positive flow days. We find consistent results in Table 6 Panel B where the dependent 
variable is permanent price impact, except that volatility is statistically significant and 
negatively related to purchases, suggesting purchases in higher volatility stocks have lower 
permanent price impact.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature on institutional trading costs. The 
research provides out-of-sample (non-U.S.) evidence on the costs of trading, whilst 
addressing an important and increasingly popular asset class i.e., small-cap equities. 
Employing a representative sample of actively managed small-cap equity funds that are 
available to wholesale investors, this paper analyses the trades of 12 small-cap equity funds 
over the period January 2000 to March 2004. The results indicate that trading costs are 
substantial, with the average cost of a round-trip transaction being 1.33 percent on a 
principal-weighted basis. This result is economically significant, since the average 
cumulative abnormal return for small-cap funds is estimated to be 0.60 percent per month 
(Chen et al., 2010). 
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Consistent with previous literature, price, trade duration, complexity and manager identity are 
found to be important determinants of transaction costs. Volatility also has a strong positive 
effect on the cost of sales. This is to be expected since lower priced small stocks are 
commonly associated with higher volatility of returns (Cheung and Ng, 1992). Price impact 
costs are positively related to duration, with trade packages taking multiple days to execute 
incurring higher costs. The investment style of active small-cap equity managers also 
influences costs, with the more patient value style of managers incurring lower transaction 
costs than GARP and neutral style managers.  
 
This paper also examines price impact with respect to fund flow experience. We find that on 
days when a fund has positive flows sales have higher information effects than days when the 
fund has negative flows. The sale of a stock when there is no liquidity-motivated reason to do 
so is more likely to convey information to the market, and the market interprets such sales 
accordingly. 
 21 
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Table 1: Average trading activity of S&P/ASX 100 Index, Small Ords Index and Micro-cap stocks  
Table 1 reports average trading activity for S&P/ASX 100, Small Ords and micro-cap stocks. There is no index 
that captures the Micro-cap sector on the ASX; therefore this sector is proxied by the All Ordinaries stocks 
minus the S&P/ASX 300 stocks. This results in the largest 200 micro-cap stocks being included in this category. 
The reported variables include the average daily value traded, the average daily trade volume, the average daily 
number of trades and the average daily off-market volume for a typical stock in each category. All results are 
reported over a four year period from January 2000 to July 2004. 
 
 
 Daily trading 
value ($) 
Daily trading 
volume 
Daily number of 
trades 
Off-market trade 
volume 
S&P/ASX 100 16,282,498 2,380,758 312 634,188 
Small Ords 555,232 402,986 42 60,913 
Micro-cap proxy 94,902 131,717 9 10,305 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for trade packages 
Trade packages are generated using a five day gap definition, which assumes that all adjacent trades in a stock 
by one manager are part of one large order until the stock is not traded by the manager for five consecutive days 
or more. Panel A reports the frequency of packages for buys and sells. Panels B to E report results only for 
Small Ords stocks. Panel B gives a breakdown of the size classification of the stocks traded in the packages for 
both buys and sells. The smallest stocks are denoted as 1 whilst the largest stocks are denoted as 4. Panel C 
reports summary statistics for the dollar value of packages based on this size classification. Panel D reports trade 
complexity which is measured the logarithmic ratio of the package trade volume to the average trading volume 
over the 40 days prior to the beginning of the package.  Panel E reports the average number of days taken to 
execute a package. 
 
Panel A: Frequency of packages 
    Purchases Sales 
All Stocks 7666 6247 
Small Ords Stocks 5414 4411 
S&P/ASX 100 Stocks 540 644 
Package data for Small-Ordinaries stocks 
  All 
Buys 
(Small)     (Large) All  
Sells 
(Small)     (Large) 
  1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
N 5414 283 887 1669 2575 4411 213 678 1352 2168 
Panel B: Breakdown of Size Classification by Market Capitalisation (Millions) 
Mean 472 92 188 314 714 494 87 182 322 738 
SD 302 32 59 92 259 327 38 57 98 293 
Median 404 87 186 303 656 426 82 182 313 659 
Q1 238 69 147 245 524 242 65 146 249 521 
Q3 645 106 228 374 865 653 105 218 391 903 
Panel C: Dollar Value of Packages (Thousands) 
Mean 342 315 359 319 353 351 309 323 332 377 
SD 588 512 622 521 624 587 532 610 582 587 
Median 157 129 173 140 167 161 115 128 150 182 
Q1 63 39 65 56 69 67 33 42 60 84 
Q3 365 381 411 333 363 378 310 329 353 409 
Panel D: Trade Complexity 
Mean 0.78 2.44 1.47 0.76 0.38 0.78 3.32 1.33 0.79 0.35 
SD 2.21 4.81 3.64 1.71 0.79 3.06 10.70 3.63 1.96 0.66 
Q1 0.22 0.79 0.48 0.24 0.15 0.20 0.61 0.38 0.25 0.15 
Median 0.08 0.23 0.18 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.06 
Q3 0.64 2.36 1.31 0.72 0.34 0.58 2.21 1.12 0.70 0.36 
Panel E: Duration (Trading Day) 
Mean 3.5 3.7 4.4 3.5 3.1 3.7 5.4 4.1 3.6 3.4 
SD 4.8 6.7 5.9 5.0 3.8 5.1 7.6 5.6 5.1 4.5 
Q1 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Median 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Q3 4.0 4.0 6.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 4.0 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for trade packages for flow groups 
Trade packages are generated using a five day gap definition, which assumes that all adjacent trades in a stock 
by one manager are part of one large order until the stock is not traded by the manager for five consecutive days 
or more. The table reports results only for Small Ords stocks partitioned into positive, no flow and negative flow 
groups. A package is defined as a positive (negative) flow package if the net flow on the first day of the package 
is in the top (bottom) quintile of all net daily flows for the fund. Panel A gives the size classification of the 
stocks traded in the packages for both buys and sells. Panel B reports summary statistics for the dollar value of 
packages based on this size classification. Panel C reports trade complexity which is measured the logarithmic 
ratio of the package trade volume to the average trading volume over the 40 days prior to the beginning of the 
package.  Panel D reports the summary statistics for the number of days taken to execute a package. 
 
  Purchases Sales 
  Neg Flow No Flow Pos Flow Neg Flow No Flow Pos Flow 
N 650 2,932 1,832 1,722 2,272 417 
Panel A: Size Classification by Market Capitalisation (Millions) 
Mean 543 452 479 521 475 479 
SD 312 298 302 324 330 313 
Q1 279 224 242 261 231 240 
Median 505 383 414 467 402 414 
Q3 722 629 647 692 629 659 
Panel B: Dollar Value of Packages (Thousands) 
Mean 322 349 335 336 366 333 
SD 472 570 650 605 580 551 
Q1 94 58 61 69 62 71 
Median 194 160 138 162 167 141 
Q3 346 391 348 333 420 336 
Panel C: Trade Complexity 
Mean 0.55 0.81 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.91 
SD 1.55 2.39 2.08 3.45 2.55 3.86 
Q1 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.07 
Median 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.22 0.20 
Q3 0.44 0.71 0.65 0.50 0.62 0.57 
Panel D: Duration (Trading Days) 
Mean 2.9 2.8 2.1 2.4 3.1 2.6 
SD 2.5 3.4 2.5 2.9 3.6 3.3 
Q1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Median 2 2 1 1 2 1 
Q3 4 3 2 2 4 3 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics for Price Impact Measures 
Principal weighted means for three price impact measures are presented for both purchases and sales. A positive 
(negative) flow trade package is defined as whether on the first day of the trade package, net buying (selling) is 
in the top quintile of all net buying (selling) days for the fund. Total refers to total price impact and is the 
logarithmic return from the weighted average price of the package to the opening price on the first day of the 
package. Temp refers to temporary price impact and is the logarithmic return from the weighted average price of 
the package to the closing price on the last day of the package. Perm refers to permanent price impact and is the 
logarithmic return from the closing price on the last day of the package to the opening price on the first day of 
the package. The price impact measures are adjusted for market conditions following Chiyachantana et al. 
(2004) and using the Small Ordinaries Accumulation Index as the market return.  
 
  Purchases Sales 
Flow Group Stat Total Temp Perm Total Temp Perm 
All Mean 0.99 -0.21 1.20 -0.34 0.06 -0.41 
Neg Flow  1.07 -0.26 1.33 -0.21 -0.04 -0.18 
No Flow  0.92 -0.13 1.05 -0.64 0.24 -0.88 
Pos Flow  1.08 -0.31 1.39 0.90 -0.58 1.49 
Neg Flow - Pos Flow Mean -0.01 0.06 -0.07 -1.11 0.55 -1.66 
 t-stat -0.04 0.35 -0.23 -4.43 2.87 -4.34 
 Prob. 0.97 0.73 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 5: Package Characteristics and the Cost of Trading 
Principal-weighted mean price impacts are reported for both purchases and sales. A positive figure denotes a 
cost, whilst a negative denotes a benefit. Total refers to total price impact and is the logarithmic return from the 
weighted average price of the package to the opening price on the first day of the package. Temp refers to 
temporary price impact and is the logarithmic return from the weighted average price of the package to the 
closing price on the last day of the package. Perm refers to permanent price impact and is the logarithmic return 
from the closing price on the last day of the package to the opening price on the first day of the package. The 
price impact measures are adjusted for market conditions following Chiyachantana et al. (2004) and using the 
Small Ordinaries Accumulation Index as the market return. Costs are reported based on the market capitalisation 
classification of the stock underlying the package. The smallest stocks are denoted as 1 whilst the largest stocks 
are denoted as 4. Costs are reported based on the trade complexity of the package defined as the logarithmic 
ratio of the package trade volume to the average trading volume 40 days prior to the beginning of the package. 
Costs are reported based on package duration, whether the package was executed over a single day or over 
several days.  
 
      Purchases Sales 
    
Avg 
Mkt 
Cap 
($M) 
Total Temp Perm N 
Avg 
Mkt 
Cap 
($M) 
Total  Temp Perm N 
Market 
Cap 
1 
(smallest) 
167 1.37 -0.49 1.86 1369 162 -1.32 0.49 -1.81 1,085 
2 320 1.57 -0.40 1.97 1412 323 -0.22 -0.03 -0.19 1,044 
3 534 0.30 -0.38 0.68 1310 524 -0.35 0.05 -0.40 1,158 
4 
(largest) 
888 0.72 0.39 0.32 1323 990 0.33 -0.18 0.51 1,124 
Trade 
Complexity 
1 
(least) 
736 0.13 -0.12 0.25 1306 763 0.00 0.09 -0.09 1,150 
2 653 0.45 -0.25 0.70 1364 689 -0.08 0.00 -0.09 1,092 
3 563 -0.08 -0.36 0.28 1344 635 0.19 0.00 0.19 1,113 
4 
(most) 
414 1.48 -0.16 1.64 1400 448 -0.61 0.10 -0.71 1,056 
Number of 
Days 
Single  472 -0.08 -0.28 0.20 2837 530 -0.12 -0.07 -0.05 2,293 
Multiple 488 1.45 -0.17 1.63 2577 532 -0.46 0.13 -0.59 2,118 
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Table 6: The Determinants of Price Impact 
Table reports the regression results for the following model: 
iPosFlowNegFlowFundsizeDurationVolTrCompMcapMarketPI   87654321 lnlnlnln  
Where PI refers to the total price impact in Panel A and permanent price impact in Panel B, lnMarket is the 
Small Ordinaries Index log return from the opening level on the first day of the trade package to the closing 
level on the last day of the trade package. lnMcap is the natural logarithm of market capitalisation of the stock 
average package price. lnTrComp is the natural logarithm of the ratio between the volume trading in the package 
over the average normal trading volume in the package forty days before the package begins. Vol is the standard 
deviation of the natural logarithm of daily stock returns in the past 180 days. lnDuration is the natural logarithm 
of the number of days it takes to complete a package. NegFlow is a dummy equal 1 if the trade package starts on 
a negative flow day, 0 otherwise. PosFlow is an analogous measure using positive flow days.‘Pos flow=Neg 
flow’ is a F-test The reported F-stat statistics and the significance levels are based on running the regression 
with robust standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity.  
 
 Panel A. Dependent Variable – Total Price Impact 
Variable Purchases Sales Purchases Sales 
Intercept 4.16* -10.14*** 1.33 -7.07** 
Market Conditions 0.49*** 0.59*** 0.51*** 0.59*** 
ln Mcap 0.10 0.50*** 0.13 0.35*** 
ln Trcomp 0.05 0.02 -0.07* -0.02 
Vol -0.06 -0.64*** -0.07 -0.67*** 
ln Duration 0.46*** -0.54*** 0.37*** -0.55*** 
ln Fundsize -0.31*** 0.06 -0.24*** 0.09 
Neg flow 0.13 0.12 0.44*** -0.09 
Pos flow 0.00 0.61*** 0.12 0.60*** 
Pos flow=Neg flow 1.01 6.43** 6.39** 12.55*** 
F Statistic 49.42*** 32.84*** 62.99*** 45.5*** 
Adjusted R-squared 13.86 11.50 11.18 9.99 
N 5,414 4,411 5,414 4,411 
Fixed Effects Fund Fund Style Style 
 
 Panel B. Dependent Variable – Permanent Price Impact 
Variable Purchases Sales Purchases Sales 
Intercept 3.24 -8.38** 11.67*** -9.87* 
Market Conditions 1.10*** 1.17*** 1.09*** 1.16*** 
ln Mcap 0.01 0.60*** 0.00 0.80*** 
ln Trcomp -0.08 0.04 0.06 0.11 
Vol -0.23** -1.21*** -0.21** -1.17*** 
ln Duration 0.54*** -0.92*** 0.57*** -0.89*** 
ln Fundsize -0.19*** -0.05 -0.59*** -0.22 
Neg flow 0.34* -0.13 0.11 0.11 
Pos flow 0.12 0.88*** -0.01 0.86*** 
Pos flow=Neg flow 1.48 12.91*** 0.43 7.13*** 
F Statistic 104.05*** 67.88*** 69.27*** 45.79*** 
Adjusted R-squared 17.31 14.29 18.50 15.45 
N 5,414 4,411 5,414 4,411 
Fixed Effects Fund Fund Style Style 
***, **, and * indicates significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
